Leicester City is ranked 16th out of the 4,215 settlements assessed within England in the National Priority Ranking in terms of surface water flooding risks (Defra 2009). Fluvial flood risks are also considered high due to its geographical and geological setting. A Multi-Agency Flood Plan (MAFP) is coordinated by the Local Resilience Forum for Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland (LLR LRF) in 2012 and it is regularly reviewed by its constituent organizations. The plan makes arrangements and provides information for multi-agency response to flooding incidents, aiming to: (i) provide a framework for the coordination of a multi-agency response to flooding events in the LLR LRF area; and (ii) link and coordinate Local Authority, Community Flood Plans and individual agencies operational plans relating to flooding. According to the CCA 2004, the local responders in the MAFP are divided into two categories, with a different set of duties on each. Those in Category One are organisations at the core of the response to flood emergencies (e.g. local authorities and emergency services). The LLR LRF recognizes that the successful implementation of MAFP requires the key operational and stakeholder organizations (e.g. Fire & Rescue, A&E and water companies) to provide efficient and non-disruptive services collectively. This, to a large extent, depends on the functioning of critical infrastructure nodes and networks. The LLR LRF seeks to understand how robust, the MAFP is in terms of its dependency on the critical infrastructure in a changing climate. In addition, its core organizations (e.g. Leicester City Council, Leicestershire Fire & Rescue Service) are keen to understand the robustness of their specific organizational plans, including the Local Authority Plan and Emergency Services Plan. For example, if a designated shelter/reception centre is at risk of flooding, it may have a cascading effect on the way that evacuation and rescue operations are carried out. Similarly, a damaged electricity substation may affect the functioning of infrastructure services that effective emergency response replies upon. In particular, a flooded transport system may render the planned routes to rescue inaccessible, thus affecting the existing evacuation/rescue plan of the emergency services (e.g. Fire & Rescue; A&E). This project brings together a group of interdisciplinary researchers in three schools in Loughborough University, including Geography, Civil & Building Engineering, and Business & Economics, with expertise in flood risk management, climate change adaptation, emergency planning, transport response to weather conditions and resilience to flood risks, to work with the key Category 1 responders in Leicester (City Council, Fire and Rescue Service and the Environment Agency) on this issue, liaised through the Local Resilience Forum for Leicester, Leicestershire and Rutland. The project will consider two types of interlinked infrastructure that are directly related to the implementation of emergency planning and response, including: (i) those functioning as operational nodes & networks, where decisions will be made, rescue will be launched and reallocation will be based; and (ii) essential utility & supporting infrastructure located in flood zones for operational reasons. Key deliverables include: 1) An assessment of the individual and networked impact of infrastructure failures. 2) A list of recommendations in the form of adaptation measures and contingency plans to the Leicester Resilience Forum's Multi-agency Flood Plan, the Leicester Fire & Rescue Service's flood response plan, and the A&E Service (through the Council). 3) Generic recommendations to flood emergency planning and response that can be readily adopted by decision makers beyond the Leicester City.

What will the UK's critical infrastructure look like in 2030? In 2050? How resilient will it be? Decisions taken now by policy makers, NGOs, industrialists, and user communities will influence the answers to these questions. How can this decision making be best informed by considerations of infrastructural resilience? This project will consider future developments in the UK's energy and transport infrastructure and the resilience of these systems to natural and malicious threats and hazards, delivering a) fresh perspectives on how the inter-relations amongst our critical infrastructure sectors impact on current and future UK resilience, b) a state-of-the-art integrated social science/engineering methodology that can be generalised to address different sectors and scenarios, and c) an interactive demonstrator simulation that operationalises the otherwise nebulous concept of resilience for a wide range of decision makers and stakeholders.Current reports from the Institute for Public Policy Research, the Institution of Civil Engineers, the Council for Science and Technology, and the Cabinet Office are united in their assessment that achieving and sustaining resilience is the key challenge facing the UK's critical infrastructure. They are also unanimous in their assessment of the main issues. First, there is agreement on the main threats to national infrastructure: i) climate change; ii) terrorist attacks; iii) systemic failure. Second, the complex, disparate and interconnected nature of the UK's infrastructure systems is highlighted as a key concern by all. Our critical infrastructure is highly fragmented both in terms of its governance and in terms of the number of agencies charged with achieving and maintaining resilience, which range from national government to local services and even community groups such as local resilience forums. Moreover, the cross-sector interactions amongst different technological systems within the national critical infrastructure are not well understood, with key inter-dependencies potentially overlooked. Initiatives such as the Cabinet Office's new Natural Hazards Team are working to address this. The establishment of such bodies with responsibility for oversight and improving joined up resilience is a key recommendation in all four reports. However, such bodies currently lack two critical resources: (1) a full understanding of the resilience implications of our current and future infrastructural organisation; and (2) vehicles for effectively conveying this understanding to the full range of relevant stakeholders for whom the term resilience is currently difficult to understand in anything other than an abstract sense. The Resilient Futures project will engage directly with this context by working with relevant stakeholders from many sectors and governance levels to achieve a step change in both (1) and (2). To achieve this, we will focus on future rather than present UK infrastructure. This is for a two reasons. First, we intend to engender a paradigm shift in resilience thinking - from a fragmented short-termism that encourages agencies to focus on protecting their own current assets from presently perceived threats to a longer-term inter-dependent perspective recognising that the nature of both disruptive events and the systems that are disrupted is constantly evolving and that our efforts towards achieving resilience now must not compromise our future resilience. Second, focussing on a 2030/2050 time-frame lifts discussion out of the politically charged here and now to a context in which there is more room for discussion, learning and organisational change. A focus on *current resilience* must overcome a natural tendency for the agencies involved to defend their current processes and practices, explain their past record of disruption management, etc., before the conversation can move to engaging with potential for improvement, learning and change.

Emergency services (Ambulance Service; Fire & Rescue Service) play a crucial role during flood response, as they participate in joint command-control structures and are central to rescue and relief efforts (Frost 2002). Emergency services are often legislated to meet defined response times. UK legislation requires that emergency responders comply with strict timeframes when reacting to incidents. Category 1 responders such as the Ambulance Service and the Fire & Rescue Service are required to reach 75% of 'Red 1' (high-priority, life-threatening incidents) in less than 8 and 10 minutes respectively from the time when the initial call was received. This includes blue-light incidents such as life-threatening and traumatic injury, cardiac arrest, road collisions, and individuals trapped by floodwaters. In 2015-16, only one England ambulance trust met the response time targets and 72.5% of the most serious (Red 1) calls were responded to within 8 minutes, against a legislative target of 75% (National Audit Office, 2017). Between 2007-2014, the highest percentage Scottish Ambulance Service achieved was 74.7% in 2013 (HEAT standard). Rising demand combined with inefficient call handling and dispatch systems are often cited as the reasons for missing the above targets. However, response times can also be affected by flood episodes which may limit the ability of emergency responders to navigate through a disrupted road network (as was the case during the widespread UK flooding in 2007). The impact of flooding on road networks is well known and is expected to get worse in a changing climate with more intense rainfall. For example, in Portland, USA under one climate change scenario, road closures due to flooding could increase time spent travelling by 10% (Chang et al. 2010). The impact of an increased number of flooding episodes, due to climate change, on road networks has also been modelled by for the Boston Metropolitan area, USA (Suarez et al., 2005). This study found that between 2000 and 2100 delays and trip-time losses could increase by 80% and 82% respectively. The Pitt Review (2008) suggested that some collaborative decision making during the 2007 event was hampered by insufficient preparation and a lack of information, and better planning and higher levels of protection for critical infrastructure are needed to avoid the loss of essential services such as water and power. More recently, the National Flood Resilience Review (HMG, 2016) exposes the extent to which a significant proportion of critical assets are still vulnerable to flooding in England and Wales. In particular, it highlights that the loss of infrastructure services can have significant impacts on people's health and wellbeing. This project will combine: (i) an established accessibility mapping approach; (ii) existing national flood datasets; and (iii) a locally tested, recent-expanded real-time flood nowcasting/forecasting system to generate accessibility mapping, vulnerability assessment and adaptation evaluation for various flood conditions and at both the national and city-region scale. The project will be delivered via three sequential Work Packages, including: (a) Mapping emergency service accessibility according to legislative timeframes; (b) Assessing the vulnerability of populations (care homes, hospices and schools); and (c) Evaluating adaptation strategies (e.g. positioning standby vehicles).