The study will aim to identify the current state of knowledge related to each sub-theme, identifying existing research strengths and knowledge gaps. Given that UKRI seeks to take a systems view of its proposed research themes, the study will also explore the interdependencies between sub-themes. Note: AHRC has agreed to pay 100% of project costs of GBP 48900 (see resources summary)

In December 2014, RUSI launched a Strategic Hub for Organised Crime Research to develop a world class research agenda that meets the needs of policymakers. With the support of government agencies and Research Councils UK, RUSI is eager to build the momentum behind the Strategic Hub to overcome the fragmented knowledge base on organised crime and contribute to policy solutions. The increased visibility of organised crime and the recognition of the cost to the UK has resulted in new strategies to respond to criminal activity. The Home Office has developed the Serious and Organised Crime Strategy and established the National Crime Agency. The new strategy takes a holistic approach to organised crime, seeking to Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare. Despite renewed energy to combat organised crime, significant knowledge gaps remain. The 2011 Home Office report, 'Future Directions in Organised Crime Research' recognised that the understanding of the scale, impacts, costs and victims of organised crime was inadequate, and an understanding of the individuals engaged in organised crime, including their relationships and the markets they operate within, was lacking. The report pointed to the need to evaluate existing interventions to address organised crime, to develop a better evidence base around drivers, and understand the changing nature of organised crime and future areas of concern. Academic research on organised crime has been expanding, which provides an avenue to fill some of these knowledge gaps. Without being driven by a particular policy agenda, academic researchers have the freedom and flexibility to engage with a wide variety of areas, determining which areas are important and warrant further investigation. The emphasis on empirical data provides rich and detailed analysis of how organised crime manifests in different environments, who is involved, and the tensions that arise within organised criminal activity. While organised crime is a growing area of research for academics, much of the research that has emerged is disconnected from the needs of policymakers. Policy development and scholarly analysis proceed on different tracks. The freedom that underpins academic research can mean that it is disconnected from the needs of policymakers. Instead research may advance theoretical debates which do not enhance responses to organised crime. As a result, there is much to be gained from a dialogue between the two. Academic analysis can improve approaches to organised crime, and provide a deeper understanding of the phenomena, while policymakers and practitioners elucidate problem areas and where further analysis is required, ensuring that academic investigation has a significant impact. RUSI is well positioned to bridge this gap. With a strong research background and an extensive network of academics working on organised crime, RUSI is engaged in and connected to the growing body of academic research in this area. RUSI also works closely with government agencies addressing organised crime, ensuring a detailed understanding of policy needs. The Strategic Hub was launched at a conference on 8 December 2014, bringing together policymakers, practitioners and academics to discuss the challenges they face and where further research and analysis is needed. The conference generated an enthusiastic response, and RUSI has created a database of over 200 academics, 65 policymakers and 25 practitioners working on organised crime. This proposal is seeking support to maintain the momentum of the Hub and continue to build the network. With support from the ESRC, RUSI will build the network and through a series of workshops and other events, transform existing academic research into useful products for policymakers. The Hub also seeks to influence further academic research to ensure it meets policy needs. Additional funding will be sourced from other funders to pursue specific research projects that emerge from the Hub.

What is meant by 'international intervention'? What are we trying to achieve, and who is the 'we' in this context? Are we guilty of assuming that everyone who talks about intervention is using the same language? Do we understand sufficiently well the full range of ways in which outside actors, usually powerful countries in the North, intervene in response to situations of crisis and conflict, usually in the poorer countries of the South? Are there unexpected consequences of intervention, should they be unexpected, and are interveners' expectations realistic in the first place? Do we appreciate the perspectives of those 'on the receiving end' of international intervention compared to those of the outsiders who intervene? These and other questions will be addressed by a three year series of multidisciplinary seminars that will bring together a wide range of practitioners, policy-makers, and private sector organisations with an interest in international development and peace support interventions. The seminars will draw on the perspectives on intervention of different groups of people: academics for whom it is a subject for scholarly research, government officials who have to determine how to intervene to deliver specific policy objectives, and practitioners who are themselves interveners but who may have a different perspective on whether intervention is a good thing or not and whether it is carried out well. Understanding the position of government officials, NGOs, the UN, the military, and other government agencies must be the starting point for any exploration of this topic. By bringing together representatives of these different stakeholders the seminar series will provide a unique platform for the development of a holistic approach to studying international intervention. Each seminar will focus on a distinct dimension of this topic and consider it from two separate but related angles: - How do the various theories of intervention in International Relations and other disciplines compare with the practice? - How do perceptions of intervention differ depending on whether one is an intervener or a target for intervention - and on where one sits in the sub-groups belonging to both categories? Areas to be covered include: - Frames of reference that can be used to develop a more comprehensive understanding of intervention; - How Northern governments decide to intervene; - How new technologies influence these decisions; - What can be learnt from the stories about intervention that are told in art and literature 'on the receiving end'; - Whether policy and practice regarding intervention are sufficiently sensitive to issues of gender, given the weight currently attached to 'women, peace, and security' as a guiding principle for intervention; - How stability and resilience can be built in societies affected by crisis. The series will conclude with a results and findings conference bringing together the conclusions from the series as a whole. In order to understand the view from 'the receiving end' the individual seminars will include invited speakers from different countries affected by intervention. Their participation seeks to establish a dialogue between interveners and intervened upon. It will also help to shape a new research agenda that is sensitive to competing interests and policy agendas on the ground. The main aim of the project is to provide an evidence based framework for decision-making about when and how to intervene based on a more mature appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches, including the likely consequences of intervening or not intervening. The project will generate new topics for academic research, which in turn will play a key part in delivering this policy outcome. The series as a whole aims also to establish a collaborative network of academics, practitioners, and policy-makers who can continue to work on these issues once the series has concluded.

A spiralling crisis is unfolding in the Sahel - which extends from Senegal to Chad, and from the Sahara Desert to the northern parts of Nigeria and Cameroon. Violent extremism has been spreading through the West African region, fuelling humanitarian emergencies and political upheavals that have threatened recent democratic progress. Governance and security dynamics are closely connected, yet their mutual effects and the role of political elites in shaping these dynamics is still poorly understood. This project aims to identify ways to simultaneously promote security and democratic outcomes, through original and collaborative interdisciplinary research. This research will address how democratisation, security, and elite politics intersect in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Nigeria: three countries spanning across two conflict zones (the Central Sahel and Lake Chad Basin) and displaying distinct historical trajectories, but facing similar challenges to their security and democratic prospects. Drawing on the PI's experience of conducting comparative research in the region and the local knowledge and networks of three West African postdoctoral researchers and their home institutions (IGD in Burkina Faso, LASDEL in Niger, and the University of Ibadan's DPSHS in Nigeria), we will conduct qualitative research in these countries to investigate the mutual effects of democratisation processes and institutions, security approaches, and elites' political survival strategies, and the implications of these findings for domestic and international policymakers' engagement in the region. Based upon key informant interviews with politicians, civil society activists, military officers, diplomats, and other stakeholders, and content analysis of media reports, government communication, legislation and grey literature, the project combines in-depth case studies with a comparative approach cutting across linguistic cleavages (between Francophone and Anglophone Africa) and conflict zones (Lake Chad Basin and Central Sahel). In turn, the project's findings will contribute to the evidence base informing civil society groups' and international partners' engagement in the region. Building upon the existing connections between the PI and her institution, and highly-respected institutions including the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in the UK and the Timbuktu Institute in West Africa, we will continuously engage with policymakers and practitioners - from domestic and international think-tanks to the UK's FCDO and the EU's EEAS - to maximise the impact of our research. Implementing this project will allow the PI to hone her leadership skills and consolidate her reputation as an expert in her field, with support from her mentor - Dr Ed Stoddard. In turn, she will support the career development of the researchers through mentoring and tailored training, provided in tandem with an advisor in each host institution: Dr Abdoul Karim Saidou (IGD, Burkina Faso), Dr Oumarou Hamani (LASDEL, Niger), and Dr Nathaniel Danjibo (University of Ibadan, Nigeria). The PI will produce a book manuscript, a journal article aimed at African Security, and two policy briefs in collaboration with RUSI and the Timbuktu Institute, with support from the postdoctoral researchers. The project will also lead to the production of three additional articles each written by a postdoctoral researcher, with guidance and contribution from the PI. Advisors in each institution will also have opportunities to contribute to the project's outputs. Findings will also be disseminated through workshops and webinars bringing together academics and policymakers, and major conferences in the UK and in Africa. Overall, this research will enable scholars, analysts, and policymakers to understand the mutual effect security and democratisation dynamics have on each other, ultimately contributing to addressing the challenges faced by Sahelian countries.

Terrorist risks and threats are increasingly identified and countered through new forms of data analytics made possible by rapid advances in machine learning (ML) and artificial intelligence (AI). Private actors, including social media platforms, airlines and financial institutions, now actively collaborate with states and international organisations (IOs) to implement ambitious data-led security projects to support global counterterrorism efforts. The UN Security Council (UNSC) has called on all states to intensify the exchange of information about suspected terrorists by building watchlists and sharing biometric data, using ML to predictively identify 'future terrorists' in advance. Social media platforms are using AI to detect extremist content online and regulate global data flows on an unprecedented scale. Passenger data from the aviation industry is analysed to identify suspicious 'patterns of behaviour' and control the movements of risky travellers. Financial data is mined by banks to spot suspicious transactions and terrorist 'associations'. These changes are all putting new and far-reaching global information infrastructure projects into motion. Yet the implications of these shifts for how international law is practiced, global security threats known and powerful actors held accountable remain uncertain. The data infrastructures underlying global governance have been largely neglected in legal scholarship. And whilst potential problems that AI poses (discrimination and privacy violations) are becoming clearer, solutions remain elusive - especially in the security domain, where secrecy is key and the inner workings of algorithms are 'black-boxed' even more than usual. Regulatory theorists argue that we urgently need to 'expand our frame of rights discourse to encompass our socio-technical architecture' to respond to the accountability challenges of AI (Yeung 2019). Data infrastructures, in other words, might provide the basis for reimagining how information and rights could be reconnected in our digital present. This project rethinks global security law from the 'infrastructure space' it is creating, focusing on (i) countering terrorism online and (ii) controlling the movements of 'risky' individuals. My hypothesis is that the most far-reaching changes to global security governance are not being written in the language of international law, or created through the formal powers of states and IOs, but built through new socio-technical infrastructures and the expertise they are enabling. Data infrastructures are critical for understanding how rights might be extended through AI. I develop the concept of 'infra-legalities' (or, the regulatory effects of data infrastructures) to analyse these shifts and develop a new approach for studying international law and regulation in the age of algorithmic global governance. Infrastructure is usually disregarded as an invisible substrate on which powerful actors act. It is rarely seen as something through which knowledge and governance can be created and shaped. Drawing from Science and Technology Studies, computer science and security studies, this project performs what Bowker and Star (1999) call an 'infrastructural inversion' by mapping the seemingly mundane governance work of data infrastructures in this domain. By 'following the data' - and tracing the socio-technical relations, norms, knowledge practices and power asymmetries that security infrastructures are enacting - a different method of studying global governance can emerge. States, IOs and tech platforms are all calling for the ethical development of AI. Different regulatory approaches are proposed with no consensus on how to mitigate the adverse effects of AI whilst embracing its vast potentialities. Studying the infra-legalities of global security law opens space for addressing these challenges and shaping current policy debates on security, trust and accountability in the age of AI and automation.